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T he failure of previous United States Administrations to send the 1977 Protocol I 1 to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification by the 
President was both a politic,al and a military decision. Accordingly, it is possible, 
but unlikely, that different action will be taken by the Clinton Administration. 
Why, then, does the United States object to the provisions of this law-of-war 
treaty, the purpose of the drafting of which was to fill in the lacunae which had 
admittedly been found to exist in the Regulations Attached to the 1907 Hague 
Convention No. IV Respecting the LAws and Customs if War on LAnd 2 (1907 Hague 
Regulations on LAnd Warfare) and in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions? 3 True, 
the United States has stated that it considers itselfbound by the rules contained 
in the 1977 Protocol I which represent customary international law-but only to 
the extent that they reflect customary international law as determined by United 
States legal advisers.4 
A review of the provisions of the 1977 Protocol Ilabeled as objectionable by 
officials of the United States in informal presentations will quickly demonstrate 
that there are actually no overpowering reasons to object to the vast majority of 
those provisions.5 The finding of a need for two dozen or more reservations and 
two dozen or more understandings (as reported to have been demanded by the 
Joint ChiefS of Staff) can only have resulted from "nitpicking.,,6 While there 
are unquestionably some really objectionable provisions, these could very easily 
be taken care of at the time of ratification. Other provisions may not be worded 
exacdyas the United States would have desired, but this is not a valid reason for 
a reservation or an understanding unless the objectionable wording results in an 
ambiguous or unintended or unwanted meaning--and such instances are rare. 
President Reagan's statement in his message to the Senate that "Protocol I is 
fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed" 7 was a gross overstatement of the facts, 
resulting from overreaction to a very small group of provisions on one subject 
which, concededly, were flawed. 
Because the document containing the specific objections to the 1977 Protocol 
I registered by the Joint ChiefS of Staff is still classified, we must have recourse 
to other sources in order to ascertain what at least some of those objections may 
be. This information we have, to an abbreviated extent, in the letter from the 
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Secretary of State to the President submitting the 1977 Protocol II for transmission 
to the Senate, and in more detail in presentations made at various meetings b~ 
representatives of the Department of State and of the Department of Defense. 
Presumably, the objections stated by these officials are the x:najor reasons for the 
non-ratification of the Protocol by the United States.9 . 
To begin at the beginning, certainly the Preamble of the 1977 Protocol lis 
clear and concise and leaves nothing to interpretation. Mter three paragraphs 
which, in sum, point out that the fact that the international community has 
drafted rules applicable during the course of international armed conflict in no 
manner legitimizes aggression or the threat or use of force, there appears a 
substantive provision which states that such rules 
must be applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those 
instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin 10 the anned 
cotiflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict. 0 
The importance of this statement cannot be overemphasized as it definitely lays 
to rest the 'Just war" doctrine espoused by some nations, including, particularly, 
a number of Third World nations as well as the nations which were Communist 
at that time period, under which the humanitarian law of war would be binding 
upon the "aggressor," always the enemy, while it would not be binding upon 
the victim of aggression, always onesel£ The United States has expressed no 
objection to the Preamble which, in fact, states a proposition to which the United 
States has long adhered: that the provisions of the humanitarian law of war are 
equally applicable to both sides in any international conflict, no matter what the 
cause alleged.ll 
The United States objects strongly and, in the opinion of this author, properly 
so, to Article 1(4) of 1977 Protocol 1. 12 In addition to being objectionable in 
itself, that article lays the foundation for other objectionable provisions of the 
Protocol. The troublesome material in Article 1(4) reads as follows: 
The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in 
which people are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination .... 13 
Obviously, this provision refers to civil conflicts, i.e., internal conflicts, which 
have always heretofore been considered to be governed by national law, not 
international law, except insofar as Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions may be said to govern civil conflicts--something that rebels have 
heretofore steadfasdy denied, or disregarded. Moreover, as we shall see, with its 
implementation by Article 44(3), the provision places members of so-called 
national liberation movements in a status superior to that of all other 
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combatants-exacdy the end sought by its progenitors, but scarcely one 
acceptable to nations which believe that all legal combatants should be protected 
equally. 
Article 9 of the 1874 Project oj an International Declaration Concerning the LAws 
and Customs oj War established four requirements for an individual to be 
considered a legal combatant: He must (1) be commanded by a person 
responsible for his subordinates; (2) wear a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable 
at a distance; (3) carry his arms openly; and (4) conduct military operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war.14 These requirements were 
restated in Article 1 of the Regulations Attached to the 1899 Hague Convention No. 
II with Respect to tlte LAws and Customs oj War on LAnd (1899 Hague Regulations 
on LAnd Warfore)j1S they were stated again in Article 1 of the 1907 Hague 
Regulations on LAnd Warfore/6 they were incorporated by reference in Article 
1 (1) of the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment oj Prisoners oj War 
(1929 Geneva Prisoner oj War Convention)/7 and they were again restated in the 
first three 1949 Geneva Conventions.1S Despite this continuous acceptance of 
these four requirements by the international community for over a century, the 
1977 Diplomatic Conference saw fit to discard them for the sole purpose of 
giving additional protection to members of national liberation movements. 
Article 43(1) of the 1977 Protocol I follows the foregoing historical precedent 
to the extent that it requires the armed forces of a party to a conflict to have a 
responsible commander and to enforce the law of war, even if that party does 
not recognize the government or authority of the adverse party. However, 
Article 44(3), which implements the objectionable Article 1(4) of the Protocol, 
has the effect of relieving members of national liberation movements from those 
requirements, as well as from others. It is here that the main United States 
objection to the Protocollies-and, admittedly, not without justification.19 
In a lengthy analysis of these provisions written some years ago, this author 
concluded: 
To sununarize, paragraph 3 of Article 44 requires combatants (as defined in 
Article 43) to distinguish themselves from the civilian population "while they are 
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack." They 
will fulfill that requirement if they carry their arms openly (a) during an actual 
military engagement and (b) when visible to the enemy while in the course of a 
military deployment preliminary to an attack. This appears to mean that these 
combatants may merge with the crowd, weapons concealed, until they are about 
to attack, at which time they move out of the crowd, disclose their weapons, and 
begin their attack. 
There seems litde doubt but that the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 44 
will increase the dangers to the civilian population?O 
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Paragraph 4 of Article 44 provides that even if an individual fails to meet the 
limited requirements just mentioned and is, therefore, not entitled to prisoner 
of war status, he is entitled to all of the protection available to a prisoner of war, 
including those relating to any trial and punishment. With this there can be no 
quarrel. It merely ensures what any civilized nation would certainly provide: fair 
treatment of the captured person prior to trial for his alleged criminal acts and 
a trial with all the safeguards required for such a trial to be fair?1 
The United States also seems to object to the provisions of Article 44(2) of 
the 1977 Protocol I which provide, in effect, that a combatant who has violated 
the law of war is nevertheless entitled to prisoner of war status if captured. 22 But 
there is nothing novel about that provision. Article 85 of the 1949 Third Geneva 
Convention, to which the United States is a party, as is practically every other 
member of the international community, specifically provides that prisoners of 
war prosecuted for pre-capture offenses (violations of the law of war) "shall 
retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.,,23 There is 
no basis for the statement that this paragraph of the Protocol provides that "once 
a group qualifies as a national liberation 'movement protected by article 1 (4), no 
conduct by members of the group can lead to the loss of its status as a protected 
organization." No place in the Protocol will there be found any provision for 
"qualifYing" a group. Like Article 85 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention, 
Article 44(2) of the 1977 Protocol I merely provides that pre-capture violations 
of the law of war will not affect an individual's right to the status of being a 
prisoner of war-it does not prevent his captor from trying him and, if he is 
convicted, from punishing him for any pre-capture violation of the law of war.24 
Moreover, rather surprisingly, that paragraph excepts from its coverage those 
individuals who have not complied with the provisions of Article 44(3) and (4). 
This means that the member of the national liberation movement who fails to 
carry his arms openly during a military engagement or during a military 
deployment prior to an attack is not entitled to prisoner of war status. (However, 
under Article 44(4) he is, nevertheless, entitled to all the protections to which 
a prisoner of war is entitled, so this appears to be a distinction without a 
difference.) , 
In his presentation, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State emphasized 
his position that the provisions just cited have the effect of "granting terrorist 
. b ,,25 Th . b' fc h . groups protecaon as com atants. ere IS no aSlS or suc reasomng. 
Terrorists do not engage in "war" or in "armed conflict" as those terms are 
understood in either national or international law. They engage in isolated 
criminal acts. Terrorists do not have "an internal disciplinary system which, inter 
alia) shall enfor~e compliance with the rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict" as required by Article 43(1). Any law is anathema to them. 
Terrorists do not participate in the "military engagement" or in the "military 
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deployment" specified in Article 44(3). They engage in hit-and-run or blind 
operations primarily against the civilian population?6 While members of 
national liberation movements may, and frequently do, engage in acts of 
terrorism, when they do so and are thereafter captured they may legally be 
compelled to answer for such criminal acts, just as the uniformed soldier who 
commits the identical acts may be compelled to answer for his criminal acts. 
Terrorists may claim that they are entitled to prisoner of war status when 
captured, but their claims are rarely, if ever, recognized?7 Statements to be 
found in the opinion of the United States District Court in the Lopez case,28 
the only relevant case of those cited by the Legal Adviser, are typical of the 
findings to be expected from courts on this issue. The court there said: 
There is no evidence in the record that defendant was a member of an organized 
military force which had a tribunal established for punishing violations of the rules 
and regulations of that force. To the extent that defendant is a member of any 
organization, this court can take judicial notice of the fact that that organization 
exists at least in part for the purpose of violating criminal statutes of the United 
States and that therefore such violations would conform to rather than violate the 
rules and principles of that organization .... There is no logic to the argument that 
an organization can be created for the purpose of violating the laws of this nation 
and overthrowing its government and at the same time declare its members to be 
exempt from prosecution for violation of the crirninallaws of that same country, 
the United States of America?9 
With the changes that have occurred in the political world since 1977, it is 
doubtful that many states which are party to the Protocol would find it necessary 
to take issue \vith a reservation to those few paragraphs of the Protocol 
mentioned above if such reservation were made by the United States at the time 
of ratification. Moreover, if a few parties did object and announced that they 
would not consider themselves bound by the Protocol vis-a-vis the United 
States, such action would be of little moment-and the United States would be 
in a better position with respect to the vast majority of parties and no worse off 
with respect to the few objectors. Of course, politically such an action would 
be a clear rebuff to the national liberation movements which have uncontrolled 
terrorist wings. But these are now few in number and the United States could 
li ·hh 30 ve WIt tat. 
Part II of the 1977 Protocol I is entitled "Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked" 
and does not appear to present any problems for the United States?1 However, 
in Part III, "Methods and Means of Warfare; Combatant and Prisoner of War 
Status," objections are encountered, in addition to those already mentioned in 
connection with the discussion of Articles 1(4) and 44. Some of these obje,ctions 
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present real problems, while others do not. The first objection relates to the 
provisions of Article 35(3), which state: 
3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or 
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment.32 
As to this provision, an official of the United States has said that it is "too broad 
and ambiguous and is not a part of customary law. ,,33 If it is truly ambiguous, 
certainly action should be taken to remove any ambiguity. But is it ambiguous? 
The United States and the larger part of the international community are parties 
to the Environmental Modification Convention which includes the following 
provision: 
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or 
any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having 
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or 
.. thS P 34 mJury to any 0 er tate arty. 
In the first place, it should be noted that this latter provision, accepted by the 
United States, is drafted in the disjunctive, and is, therefore, even broader than 
that contained in Article 35(3) of the 1977 Protocol, which is drafted in the 
conjunctive. In the second place, when this provision was drafted, the drafting 
conference included "understandings" with respect to each of the three 
descriptive adjectives used. They said: 
It is the understanding of the Committee that, for the purposes of this Convention, 
the terms "widespread," "long-lasting" and "severe" shall be interpreted as 
follows: 
(a) "widespread": encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square 
kilometres; 
(b) "long-lasting": lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season; 
(c) "severe": involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, 
natural and economic resources or other assets.35 
While, of course, the understandings refer to those words as used in the 
Environmental Modification Convention, it would be extremely difficult for any 
state which is a party to the 1977 Protocol I to assert that the words so defined 
had a different meaning in the Protocol; and it is rare, indeed, for the 
international community to have the benefit of agreed definitions of words of 
art included in an international convention. The conclusion is inescapable that 
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the United States has no valid reason for objecting to the substance or to the 
wording of Article 35 (3) of the 1977 Protocol I. 36 
The next provision to which objection is made is Article 39(2) which states: 
2. It is prohibited to make use of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms 
of adverse Parties while engaging in attacks or in order to shield, favour, protect 
. d mili· . 37 or Impe e tary operatIons. 
Concerning this provision the statement is made that "we [the United States] 
do not support the prohibition in article 39 of the use of enemy emblems and 
uniforms during military operations.,,38 To say that the objection to this 
provision by the United States is astonishing is an understatement. The following 
has been the official policy of the United States since as long ago as 1863: 
63. Troops who fight in the uniform of their enemies, without any plain, striking, 
and uniform mark of distinction of their own, can expect no quarter. 
65. The use of the enemy's national standard, flag, or other emblem of nationality, 
for the purpose of deceiving the enemy in battle, is an act of perfidy by which 
they lose all claim to the protection of the laws of war.39 
Article 23 (f) of both the 1899 and the 1907 Hague Regulations on Lmd Waifare 
prohibits "the improper use" of the enemy uniform or insignia,40 and a current 
field manual of the United States Army interprets that term as meaning that" [i]t 
is certainly forbidden to employ them in combat, but their use at other times is 
not forbidden.,,41 Wearing enemy uniforms "while engaging in attacks" would 
unquestionably fall within that manual's prohibition; and war crimes trials for 
the use of enemy uniforms in non-battle military operations were conducted in 
wars prior to World War 142 and in World War II.43 Finally, as noted above, 
one of the four requirements to be a legal combatant has uniformly been "the 
wearing of a fixed distinctive emblem, recognizable at a distance,,;44 and the 
removal of that requirement by Article 44(3) of the 1977 Protocol I is one of the 
major objections voiced by the United States to that instrument.45 
The next provision of the 1977 Protocol I to which objection is expressed is 
Article 47, which, in effect, denies humanitarian protection to most mercenaries. 
Why the United States should take up the cudgel on behalf of mercenaries is 
somewhat of a mystery, unless it fears that attempts might be made to place 
foreign military advisers and technicians in the category of mercenaries, despite 
the fact that they do not fall within the definition of mercenaries set forth in that 
article.46 Moreover, there is a general belief, apparendy entertained even by its 
sponsor, Nigeria, that the article will have litde, if any, effect.47 The objection 
made by the United States is apparendy not directed at the substance of the 
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provision, or from a desire to protect mercenaries, but at the fact that it is another 
instance of politicizing the 1977 Protocol I in favor of national liberation 
movements.48 This provision of 1977 Protocol I is, of course, the other side of 
the coin with respect to national liberation movements: full protection to 
members of national liberation movements no matter to what extent they violate 
the law of war; no protection to those who oppose national liberation 
movements even if they comply with the law of war. 
Objection is made to Article 51 (6) which prohibits attacks against the civilian 
population by way of reprisal. While there is much to be said for the use of 
reprisals as a method of compelling the adverse party who is violating the 
humanitarian law of war to return to compliance with that law, there is also 
much to be said in favor of prohibiting reprisals against certain categories of 
individuals, including the civilian population. The United States is a party to the 
1929 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention,49 Article 2(3) of which prohibits reprisals 
against prisoners of war; and it is a party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 
:first three of which include provisions prohibiting reprisals against the wounded 
and sick on land,50 against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea,51 and 
against prisoners of war. 52 Article 33 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, 53 
prohibits reprisals against persons protected by that convention, all of whom are 
members of civilian populations but whose categories are limited in number 
(primarily the civilian populations of occupied territories), and, in particular, 
does not include the civilian populations of the belligerents in their home 
territories. There does not appear to be any great difference between the 
wounded and sick and prisoners of war and the civilian population. All three 
categories are persons who are no longer, or were never, combatants. However, 
the United States' position would appear to be based on the belief that only the 
fear of the reprisal bombing of its own civilian population might serve as a basis 
for dissuading an enemy from bombing the civilian population of the United 
States-and there is considerable merit to that belie£54 The bombing of civilian 
populations in Europe by both sides during World War II, claimed by both sides 
to be reprisals, caused innumerable deaths and created devastation which 
probably contributed to extending the duration of the hostilities. Here, mixed 
military-humanitarian reasons might well warrant a reservation to this provision. 
(It is worthy of note that no other objection was voiced to Article 51, paragraph 
2 of which prohibits making the civilian population the subject of attack or the 
threat of attack, and paragraphs 4 and 5 of which prohibit indiscriminate attacks, 
including target area bombing.) 
For military reasons the United States objects to the provisions of Article 
56(1), which prohibits attacks on 
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[w]orks or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and 
nuclear electrical generating stations, . . . if such attack may cause the release of 
dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.55 
The Legal Adviser of the Department of State has indicated his belief that "under 
this article, civilian losses are not to be balanced against the military value of the 
target."S6 In other words, it is his position that this provision disregards the 
longstanding principle of proportionality and prohibits the attack if there are to 
be "severe" civilian losses no matter how important the target may be from a 
military point of view. S7 Accepting this as a valid possible construction of the 
provision, the United States could, upon ratification, merely "understand" that, 
as in other applicable cases, the principle of proportionalifl would apply in 
balancing the "severe" losses against the military advantage.s 
The Legal Adviser of the Department of State further points out that during 
the drafting of this provision a United States representative had called attention 
to the difference between this prohibition and current internationallaw.S9 The 
statement made by the United States representative indicated that his primary 
concern and the main thrust of his argument was not that the progress of 
international humanitarian law was removing from the category of military 
objectives installations which had previously been within that category, a 
procedure that has occurred with some degree of regularity during the past 
century (medical and religious personnel and units, military hospitals, hospital 
ships, civilian hospitals, medical aircraft, museums, places of worship, and 
cultural objects have all received this special protection), but that these specially 
protected installations might be used "as a cover to obtain military advantage.',60 
One cannot help but conclude that the military decision to object to this 
provision may well be based on the experience in North Vietnam where, when 
it became apparent that for humanitarian reasons the United States would not 
bomb the dikes, these became havens for reserve fuel supplies and anti-aircraft 
artillery weapons. While Article 56(2) attempts to eliminate this problem by 
setting forth with particularity the circumstances which will result in the 
cessation of the special protection, it must be admitted that there are some 
loopholes in that paragraph of which a lawless belligerent could avail itsel£ 
However, the adverse party could also take advantage of the language of these 
provisions as a legal basis for asserting that the known facts warrant the cessation 
of the special protection accorded to these objects. (One objection made to 
Article 56(2) is to the distinction between the stated manner in which a dam or 
dike loses its protection and the stated manner in which a nuclear power plant 
loses it protection.61 Understandably, in view of its projected effect, the latter 
is more restrictive.) 
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The United States complains that Article 5 (protecting Powers) and Article 
90 (International Fact-Finding Commission) do not go far enough because in 
both cases the consent of the parties to the conflict is required and all of the 
Communist countries have been adamant in refusing to allow any foreign or 
international body to operate or investigate on their territories.62 This was a 
valid complaint when made, but is it still valid? And although Article 5 does not 
go as far as one might have wished, it does go a bit further in the right direction 
than its predecessors in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 63 The provisions of Article 
90 for an International Fact-Finding Commission are novel and offer great 
potential even though the "non-law-abiding" nations will unquestionably 
decline to permit the Commission to function in their territories. Once again, 
although Article 90 does not go as far as one might have wished by making the 
competence of the Commission compulsory for all parties, it does represent a 
considerable advance in the methods of enforcing the humanitarian law of war.64 
Moreover, it has been so successful that already more than the required twenty 
parties have filed the requisite statement recognizing the competence of the 
Commission, and the Commission has been established.65 
. It is believed that from the foregoing it can be seen that the few valid 
objections of the United States to the 1977 Protocol I do not justify the refusal 
by the executive branch to send it to the Senate for its advice and consent to 
ratification. Rather than dozens of reservations and understandings, only a very 
few are required in order for the United States to remove from the Protocol, 
insofar as it is concerned, those provisions which it considers as politicizing that 
instrument, as well as the few provisions for which there are valid military 
objections.66 The United States can thenjoin the more than one hundred other 
members of the international community who are already parties to the 1977 
Protocol 1. 
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